Imf programs who is chosen and what are the effects

Department of Economics. Overview Fingerprint. Abstract IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables.

Link to publication in Scopus. Together they form a unique fingerprint. View full fingerprint. Journal of Monetary Economics , 52 7 , Stock, International Monetary Fund, Robert J. Barro, Santaella, Michael Hutchison, Michael M. Hutchison, "undated". Department of Economics. Hutchison, Frankel, Jeffrey A. Jeffrey A. Rose, Anne O. Krueger, Michael D. Barro, Robert J, Citation Type. Has PDF. Publication Type. More Filters. Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive … Expand.

He uses a model where an endogenous borrowing constraint, set up by … Expand. IMF was established as a financial institution for the promotion of world trade and international financial stability of members.

However, IMF focused on assistance to developing countries and … Expand. View 2 excerpts, cites background. Structural adjustment is commonly prescribed as a condition for receiving loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but the effects of structural adjustment and conditionality … Expand. The political economy of participation in IMF programs: a disaggregated empirical analysis.

The existing literature suggests that a number of economic and political variables are … Expand. View 1 excerpt, cites background. This paper assesses that participation of countries in IMF programs significantly diminishes their vulnerability to external shocks. Currently, one of the primary purposes of the IMF is to ensure … Expand. Highly Influenced. View 6 excerpts, cites background, methods and results.

This study investigates the distributional effects of international organizations within their member countries. It addresses the issue empirically by examining the causal effect of International … Expand. My bibliography Save this article.

IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects? Lee, Jong-Wha. Registered: Robert J. Barro Jong-Wha Lee. IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables. Loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional staff at the IMF and when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States and other major shareholding countries of the IMF.

These results are of considerable interest for their own sake. More importantly for present purposes, the results provide instrumental variables for estimating the effects of IMF loan programs on economic growth and other variables.

This instrumental estimation allows us to sort out the economic effects of the loan programs from the responses of IMF lending to economic conditions. The estimates show that a higher IMF loanparticipation rate reduces economic growth. IMF lending also lowers investment but raises international openness. In addition, greater involvement in IMF programs tends to lower the rule of law and democracy. We conclude that the typical country would be better off economically if it committed itself not to be involved with IMF loan programs.

This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item. Barro, Robert J. Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:vyip as. Most related items These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.

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